


CONNECTING THE DOTS IN THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: TRADE FACILITATION, INFRASTRUCTURE CONNECTIVITY AND INSTITUTIONAL COLLABORATION IN THE CHINA-AFRICA RELATIONS

PAOLO DAVIDE FARAH

West Virginia University, John D. Rockefeller IV School of Policy and Politics (USA) gLAWcal - Global Law Initiatives for Sustainable Development (UK)

AIM OF THE RESEARCH







ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND ACTORS INVOLVED FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BRI ANALYSIS OF AFRICA AS AN EXAMPLE OF REGIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BRI ANALYSIS OF TRADE FACILITATION, INFRASTRUCTURE CONNECTIVITY AND INSTITUTIONAL COLLABORATION UNDER THE BRI

STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENTATION



I. THE BRI: AN OVERVIEW

The BRI in the words of Xi Jinping is aimed at building a 'road' to: peace, prosperity, openness, innovation, and civilization.

Pillars of the BRI are **infrastructure** development, **economic integration**, **energy** and **security** cooperation, **innovation**, **human development**.

The BRI could be see as a translation in a global context of the country model of **economic development**: massive **infrastructure spending** and strong **cooperation** between **public** and **private sector**.

The Initiative captured much attention (and also critiques) for the **geopolitical**, socioeconomics and energy implications.

I. THE BRI: AN OVERVIEW

"The Vision and action to promote the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road"(Vision) attempts to clarify the coverage and scope of the BRI and identifies five major goals: Policy coordination (政策沟通), Facilities connectivity (设施联通), Unimpeded trade (贸易畅通), Financial integration (资金融通), People-to-people bond (民心相通).

The BRI is under a process of institutionalization in China and have been included under the Articles of Association of the CCP and partially under the Constitution with the concept of 'a community of shared future for mankind'(人类命运共同体)

Against the conventional wisdom the projects of the BRI are **mostly implemented** by **local** governments, SOEs, private enterprises and foreign governments.

No 'official' list of BRI projects released by the central government. No mechanism to verify at a central level if the project is aligned and consistent with BRI scope. No specific guidelines. No membership list.

II. THE BRI IN AFRICA

We could both seize the opportunity created by the complementarity between our respective development strategies and the major opportunities presented by the Belt and Road Initiative. [...] With these efforts, we could expand areas of cooperation, unlock new cooperation potential, consolidate our traditional areas of cooperation, and foster new highlights of cooperation in the new economy.

Xi Jinping, WORK TOGETHER FOR COMMON DEVELOPMENT AND A SHARED FUTURE (2018 FOCAC Beijing Summit)

II. THE BRI IN AFRICA


- Friendly relations since the establishment of PRC in 1949
- **centrality** for the success of the BRI (especially the maritime component)
- High availability of agricultural products, energy and natural resources
- Various governmental systems and difficulties in reaching common position at a regional level
- Security and governance problems
- High potential for economic development
- Need for **financial** resources
- Lack of infrastructure
- Young workforce and low cost of labor
- Relaxed regulatory environment








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II. THE BRI IN AFRICA

8 Major Initiatives (八大行动)

II. THE BRI IN AFRICA

During the seventh Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in **Beijing** in 2018 president Xi Jinping announced the implementation of 'eight major initiatives' deemed be for to necessary the of the "China-Africa construction community with a shared future that pursues win-win cooperation"

The last FOCAC highlighted also the need for China to create a **sounder framework** for its **OFDI** to **avoid** possible **drawbacks** to the BRI

The BRI is presented as a tool to **strengthen regional integration** process of Africa



II. THE BRI IN AFRICA

FOCAC 2018 Pledges



US\$15 billion of grants, interestfree loans and concessional loans,



US\$20 billion of credit lines,





US\$10 billion special fund for development financing

US\$5 billion special fund for financing imports from Africa.

A	

encourage Chinese companies to make at least US\$10 billion of investment in Africa in the next three years

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Government loans due to mature in 2018 granted to heavily indebted, poor and landlocked countries will be exempted.

II. THE BRI IN AFRICA

Discrepancy

Sinophobia

Asymmetries

Added value



TRADE FACILITATION INFRASTRUCTURE CONNECTIVITY INSTITUTIONAL COLLABORATION



The **WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement** (TFA) is the **only** agreement belonging to the WTO system recalled in the **Vision**


The **TFA** entered into force on 22 February **2017** and is the **first multilateral agreement** enacted since the establishment of the WTO in 1996

Trade facilitation **measures** as contained under the **TFA** are expected to **reduce total trade costs** by **13-14%** and these measures would mostly **benefit developing** and least developed **countries** (WTO, 2018).

Trade cost reduction is **crucial** for developing countries but should be accompanied by investments in **infrastructure**.

The BRI aims to **facilitate trade** and provide the **infrastructure** needed for **increasing exchange** of goods and services **sourcing from China**.


Trade facilitation is one of the 'eight major initiatives' launched by Xi Jinping in 2018 and have been identified for the implementation phase. 50 trade facilitation programs for Africa have been identified by the Chinese government.



The joint customs personnel training organized by the General Administration of Customs of China and an experiment in the city of Jiangmen, Guandong for the creation of a fast lane track for helping exports to Africa are two concrete and successful examples of trade facilitation

However, trade facilitation measures implemented by China are **unilateral** and carried out **outside** the **WTO** framework.

The implemented measures so far are however focused on **boosting Chinese exports** to the continent and **not on increasing intra-regional** trade and **economic integration** in Africa.



Infrastructure development is similarly central for the BRI and critical for **economic** and **social** development in Africa.

According to estimates of the African Development Bank the continent needs between **\$130** and **\$170 billion** in **financing** per year to close its **infrastructure gap**.

BRI labelled projects and China's OFDI in Africa are aimed at developing **hard** and **soft infrastructure** (mostly railway transportation systems, ports, energy and network infrastructure)

However, what is **missing** is the **connection** between the different **projects** and the coordination and collaboration at a **macro level** with **institutional actors** such as the African Union

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Trade facilitation, infrastructure connectivity and institutional collaboration should not be addressed in a bilateral manner by China. To reach this aim, it is necessary that the BRI shift focus **from a China-lead to a multilateral initiative**:

- step up the cooperation with existing actors (WB, IMF, ADB, EU, USA etc.) in the selection, implementation and monitoring of BRI projects;
- increase transparency of lending policies and disclose terms and conditions to the general public;
- integration with other regional connectivity strategies;
- transparent and non-discriminatory public procurement and an increase of the share of local contractors;
- Increase the environmental component of the BRI.



Strengthening the rule of law, legal capacity and regulatory framework of Africa countries must be the top priority of China and could have positive effects on the BRI. BRI Countries with stronger governance framework are in fact more transparent in project selection, tendering process and monitoring and this could also reduce the risks of corruption in BRI countries.

V. CONCLUSIONS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

"山高自有客行路,水深自有渡船人 -The tall mountains will have their passageways; The deep waters will have their ferry boats."

西游记 - Journey to the West



GLAWCAL

¹A timely, innovative and insightful book that addresses a wide sampe of vitally important contemporary concerns of global credit manipation from dimate change to food security to China's role in Africa through the lens of more trade issues. The editors and contributors are to be congenulated for earling edge scholarship with real world significance.²

Randy Peerenboom, La Trobe University Melbourne, Australia

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Peter Van den Bossche, World Trade Institute (WTI), Switzerland and Member, Appellate Body World Trade Organization

"This is really a "matterwork" which has appeared at the "tight time" on the "tight topic". The book assess-China's development on non-taske anonera within the context of the WTO by use of global justice and southinghe development principles. It is a great collection which critically examines China from multiple presenceives."

Minyou Yu, Wuhan University, China

International Economic Law/Asian Law/Sustainable Development/Consumer Protection

PAOLO DAVIDE FARAH Elena cima

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CONTACTS

Paolo Davide Farah

(West Virginia University, John D. Rockefeller IV School of Policy and Politics, USA and gLAWcal - Global Law Initiatives for Sustainable Development,UK)

<u>paolo.farah@glawcal.org.uk</u>



